BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP: AFTER INDOFOOD

by Philip Baker

What does the term “beneficial owner” mean in a tax treaty? In principle, we ought to know exactly what it means. The term has been used in tax treaties since the 1940s; it is in the OECD and UN and US Models; it is found in virtually every tax treaty which the United Kingdom has entered into. Curiously, we have had very little guidance as to the meaning of the term until a recent Court of Appeal decision in the case of Indofood International Finance Ltd v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA1.

The term “beneficial owner” is usually found in the dividend, interest and, sometimes, the royalties article of a tax treaty. These articles generally provide for a reduced level of withholding tax on the relevant category of income: however, the reduced tax is only available if the beneficial owner of the dividends, interest or royalties is a resident of the state which is a party to the treaty. Hence, the beneficial ownership limitations – or “BO limitation” to its friends – is a restriction on the availability of the reduced tax rate.

It is pretty clear that the BO limitation was introduced to counter treaty shopping by the channelling of the relevant income through a resident of a state with a suitably attractive treaty provision. The issue for some time has been, however, exactly how broad is the scope of the BO limitation. Put another way, how artificial
must the conduit arrangement have been for the benefit of the treaty to be denied?

At one extreme, one can imagine situations where simply by registering shares or loan notes in the name of a nominee who was resident in a treaty state, one might try to claim the benefit of the relevant treaty. At the other end of the spectrum, all companies ultimately distribute the income they receive to shareholders or other stakeholders: if a company were to be denied the benefit of a treaty because the income received might ultimately be paid on to a third party, then when would any company or collective investment vehicle ever be entitled to the benefit of the three central provisions of most tax treaties?

Surprisingly, there has been virtually no case law on the meaning of beneficial ownership until the Indofood case. There was a Dutch case a few years ago where a UK company acquired a usufruct to receive the dividends on certain Dutch shares: the Amsterdam Court held that a person who is entitled to a usufruct over the dividends only was not the beneficial owner, but the Hoge Raad correctly reversed this by holding that the mere fact that the company had an entitlement only to the dividends and not to the corpus of the shares themselves did not prevent it from being a beneficial owner. There has been a more recent Swiss case where the treaty benefit was denied on the grounds that the taxpayer had failed to prove that it was the beneficial owner. More tantalising, ten years or so ago a case was being prepared for trial before the UK Special
Commissioners concerning a Luxembourg bank in liquidation: was the bank still the beneficial owner of interest it received from the United Kingdom? Sadly, the case was settled before it went for trial.

There is Commentary from the OECD on the meaning of beneficial ownership. This has developed over the years. The original Commentary to Articles 10 and 11 of the OECD Model referred to the exclusion of agents or nominees who were interposed in an attempt to obtain treaty benefits. Following the Conduit Companies Report the Commentary was extended to include conduits which had such narrow powers over the income they received that they were in the position of mere fiduciaries with regard to that income. This seemed, in fact, to be as far as the OECD could achieve consensus on the meaning of beneficial ownership. And a very sensible point it was too: it meant that the BO limitation excluded very obvious cases of treaty shopping, but went no further. States that wished to go further than this in deterring treaty shopping could – and did – include more elaborate anti-treaty shopping provisions in specific treaties. If one looks, for example, at the anti-conduit provisions of the current UK/US Tax Treaty, they provide strong evidence that the BO limitation is of relatively narrow scope, and that the treaty partners (or at least one of them) wanted a broader anti-treaty shopping provision.

The OECD Commentary, with its emphasis on agents, nominees and conduit companies acting as mere fiduciaries, provided a fairly useful rule of thumb for
determining beneficial ownership. If the recipient entity went into liquidation, and it was a mere fiduciary, then any dividends etc., it had received could be claimed by the “real beneficial owner” and would not be available for general creditors in the liquidation. If, however, the dividends etc., really belonged to the entity in liquidation, then the income would be available for its general creditors and it would have been the beneficial owner of that income itself.

As explained, since March 2006 we do have a Court of Appeal case on the meaning of beneficial ownership, though some would doubt whether it has done much to clarify our understanding of the meaning of the term.

For a case which has sought to clarify one of the key expressions used in international taxation, what is surprising is that it was not technically a tax case. It was a civil case brought between the two parties to a loan agreement. The background is relatively complicated, but can be simplified. An Indonesian company wished to raise a loan for business purposes: if it had done so directly, there would have been a 20% withholding tax on the interest it paid. Instead of raising the loan directly, it established a Mauritius subsidiary which then issued the loan, with JP Morgan acting as trustee for the bondholders. Interest paid from Indonesia to Mauritius benefited from the Indonesia-Mauritius Tax Treaty, with a reduced withholding tax of 10%. Interest paid from Mauritius for the benefit of the bondholders was not subject to any withholding tax.
The precise terms of the arrangement with the Mauritius finance subsidiary were important. The identical amount of money was borrowed by the Mauritian company as was then lent on to the Indonesian parent: the rate of interest on the loan to and from Mauritius was identical. The terms of the documentation provided for interest to be paid by the Indonesian parent to the Mauritian subsidiary on day 1, and from the Mauritian subsidiary to the trustee for the bondholders on day 2: in fact, it was found as a fact that the interest was paid directly from the Indonesian parent to the trustee for the bondholders, missing out the Mauritian subsidiary. According to the Court of Appeal, the terms of the loan documentation precluded the Mauritian subsidiary from meeting its interest obligations to the bondholders from any source other than interest paid by its Indonesia parent, thus the Court of Appeal seems to have considered that both in practice and according to the documentation, the Mauritian subsidiary was effectively obliged to pay on every dollar received from its Indonesian parent to the bondholders: none of the interest received could be retained by the Mauritian subsidiary.

Then the Indonesia-Mauritius Tax Treaty was terminated.

The termination of the Treaty would have meant that the tax to be withheld on the interest from the Indonesian parent reverted to the normal domestic rate of 20%. However, the loan documentation contained a provision that, if the tax rate on the interest was
increased, the payer had to gross up the amount paid so that, net of the higher tax, the bondholders received the same return as previously. Because this put a heavy burden on the borrower, it had the option, *if there were no reasonable steps it could take to revert to the reduced withholding tax*, to repay the loan early.

Now one comes to the final nub of the *Indofood* case: the Indonesian borrower said that there were no reasonable steps it could take to maintain the low withholding tax, so it should be allowed to repay the loan early. By contrast, JP Morgan, acting for the bondholders, said that there was a very reasonable step which could be taken; that the Indonesian borrower should take this step; and there was no reason to repay the loan early. Pretty obviously, the interest rates available had changed so that it was attractive to the borrower to repay early and refinance, while JP Morgan, acting for the bondholders, wanted the loan to remain in place.

The simple solution proposed was to interpose a Dutch entity between the Indonesian borrower and the Mauritius entity and get the benefit of the Indonesia-Netherlands Tax Treaty, which also had a 10% reduced withholding tax (or even the possibility of a zero withholding tax).

Two arguments were raised to show that the proposed Dutch company would simply not work: that it would not be the beneficial owner of the interest; and that it would not be a resident of the Netherlands for treaty purposes. If either of these could be shown to be
correct, then the proposed Dutch company would simply not achieve the reduced withholding tax, and a measure which was doomed to failure could not be a reasonable measure to take.

Technically, the question was whether the Dutch company would be entitled to the reduced withholding tax under the Indonesia-Netherlands Tax Treaty. This was essentially a question of how the Indonesian Revenue would respond to the Dutch company – would they regard it as the beneficial owner – and, if they rejected a treaty application, how would the Indonesian Courts respond? Technically, therefore, the issue was one of Indonesian law and practice. The litigation came to London, however, because the loan agreements had a choice of jurisdiction clause which gave jurisdiction to the English High Court.

At first instance, Evan-Lombes J held that, if the Mauritian company had been the beneficial owner of the interest, so would the interposed Dutch company. Of course, there is a very simple answer to this: maybe the Mauritian company should not have been regarded as the beneficial owner in the first place.

The Court of Appeal reversed the first instance judgment. Unanimously, they considered that the proposed Dutch company would not be the beneficial owner of the interest. This meant that, for the first time, an English court had to provide a definition of the term “beneficial owner” in a tax treaty. Unfortunately, the way they did so has provided little clarity to the meaning of the term.
Two important points should be made about the Court of Appeal. First, none of the judges, and none of the counsel involved in the case, was an expert in taxation, let alone in international taxation. It is, in many respects, one of the most bizarre features of this case that a key issue concerning the meaning of a term used in multiple tax treaties was decided without any representation from a revenue authority and without the participation of anyone with any expertise in international tax before the Court of Appeal.

Secondly, as a technical matter, the Court of Appeal had only to decide whether the interposition of the Dutch company was a reasonable measure for the borrower to follow. It might have been sufficient simply to state that the Indonesian Revenue had gone on record that they would not regard such an interposed company as the beneficial owner: litigation in Indonesia was certain to follow if the proposed route was adopted, and one imagines that a route that was certain to lead to difficult litigation could hardly be a reasonable measure. That was not, however, the short cut route which the Court of Appeal adopted. Rather, the Court decided to face squarely the question of the meaning of beneficial ownership.

One of the great fears of international tax lawyers has been for many years that a question concerning beneficial ownership would come before a court in a common law country with little or no expertise in international tax. The fear was that the judges would recognise the term “beneficial ownership” from their
knowledge of equity and the law of trusts, and would assume that the term had the meaning under the common law system with which they were familiar: that is, that there was a distinction between legal ownership and beneficial ownership. The meaning of the term would then be muddled up with the distinction between the separate ownership interest of the trustee and his beneficiary under a trust. Not only would the resulting meaning lead to unintended consequences for trustees seeking to claim the benefit of tax treaties, but it would also lead to a meaning of the term “beneficial ownership” which non-common law countries would have difficulty in following.

At the end of the day, the term “beneficial ownership” is used in multiple treaties entered into between countries with common law systems and countries which have continental European civil law systems, or other systems that have totally different historical origins. What the term needed was a “international fiscal meaning” rather than a meaning that depended on the domestic law of the country where the issue arose.

If one were to applaud any point in the Court of Appeal’s judgment, it is that the Court decided that the term “beneficial owner” should not take a meaning according to the domestic law of the United Kingdom, but that it should have an “international fiscal meaning”. This is understood to mean that the Court thought it should have a meaning which would be the same in all countries, and not vary from one country to another.
The question was how to find this international fiscal meaning. Here, there are some good things and bad things about the judgment. The good things are that the Court of Appeal referred to the OECD Commentary and appeared to endorse that Commentary as giving the international fiscal meaning. The bad elements were some unfortunate references to statements from the Director General of Income Tax in Indonesia to the effect that it meant “the full privilege to directly benefit from the income”. That phrase gives little, if any, clarification to the meaning of the term. Also rather less helpful were statements by the Court of Appeal that a technical and legal approach to beneficial ownership should not be adopted, but regard should be had to “the substance of the matter”. Often in cross-border arrangements, great care is taken on the technical and legal aspects – a broad brush, substance approach was bound to lead to uncertainty.

At the end of the day, and on the basis of the facts of the case (and it is very important to recall that this was decided on the facts of the particular case) the proposed Dutch company would not have been the beneficial owner of the interest. On that basis, therefore, the proposed solution would not work, and it was not reasonable to require the borrower to go down a route that would not work.

Where does this all take us to?

If one observed the flurry of activity in the City of London after the judgment came out, one might have concluded that this was some earth-shaking revelation
which no-one could have foreseen. If one draws back for a moment, however, and looks at the facts of the case, can one really be surprised at the outcome? Recall: the Mauritian company borrowed the identical amount that it on-lent, at the same interest at which it on-lent, and the Court of Appeal found as a fact that the Mauritian company could do nothing with the interest it received but use it to pay the identical amount of interest that it had to pay on. In this type of egregious circumstance, is there any real surprise that the Dutch company which was proposed to take the place of the Mauritian company would not have been the beneficial owner? If beneficial ownership had any meaning at all, surely it would exclude the type of interposed entity which had no function whatsoever but to receive income and pay on the identical amount of income: in fact, it had so little function that, according to the Court of Appeal, the actual flows of money missed it out completely.

The biggest difficulty with the case is not that it confirms that the proposed Dutch company would not have been the beneficial owner. The real difficulty is how far the judgment extends: what other arrangements would be held to fall foul of the BO limitation?

In principle, therefore, the case itself should have had a relatively limited impact. In practice, nervous advisers have worried that it may have much broader implication, and call in question existing financial structures.

At the time of writing this short note, discussions between City law firms, the Law Society and HM
Revenue & Customs has led to the publication of draft guidance by HMRC on the impact of the *Indofood* case. The guidance seems to have been prompted by a desire to reassure the City that many existing structures would not be subject to any adverse scrutiny as a result of the case. However, it is fair to say that the approach adopted by HMRC to reach this comforting result is not particularly appealing from an intellectual point of view.

Many of the City law firms seem to have tried to bury the *Indofood* case by arguing that it was concerned with a finding of fact as to the possible outcome of a claim for treaty benefit in Indonesia, and had nothing to do with UK tax law. Technically, this may be correct. However, as a practical matter, the decision is clearly of broader import. Once the Court of Appeal accepted that the term “beneficial ownership” should have an international fiscal meaning, there was no reason why that meaning should not equally apply if similar facts arose with regard to the United Kingdom. At the very least, there is strong persuasive authority from the Court of Appeal as to the meaning they would give to this phrase.

HMRC, in its guidance, accepts that the Court of Appeal has provided guidance as to the meaning of the phrase in UK law (and not simply in Indonesia). However, they emphasise that this meaning should be seen in the context of the object and purpose of a treaty: the object and purpose includes combating international tax avoidance through treaty shopping. The guidance suggests, therefore, that the phrase only has its
international fiscal meaning when treaty shopping is intended, but does not have its international fiscal meaning when there is no treaty shopping intention. Intellectually, this is a very unattractive position to take, and it is hard to see any legal support for this approach. The approach allows HMRC, however, to identify a number of accepted commercial arrangements which, provided there is no treaty shopping intended, will not be denied treaty benefits on the grounds that the international fiscal meaning of beneficial ownership should be applied.

Whether this draft guidance becomes a final text remains to be seen.

In the meantime, the somewhat unusual circumstances of the Indofood case have provided us with the first real discussion of the meaning of beneficial ownership around the world. Whether one is any the wiser after this decision, remains to be seen.

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3 1986.
4 In fact, examination of the terms of the loan documentation – not, sadly, quoted in either the High Court or the Court of Appeal, but which have been made available to the author – show that this was probably not correct. Instead, while it was unlikely that the Mauritian subsidiary could have raised money from any other
source, it was in principle capable of doing so and was not precluded.

5 As would happen if the term was given its domestic law meaning by operation of the equivalent of Article 3(2) of the OECD Model.